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ll1a1·ch 7, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
thank the dlst.lnguished Senator from 
Missouri. I again express my apprecia-
tion to the distinguished Senator from 
Maryland <Mr. MATHIAS) for making his 
malden speech In such a statesmanlike-
manner on one of the most Important 
.<ubjects of the day. 
Mr. President, before I go into my pre-
pared remarks, I want to say a few 
words. In the first place, I want it clear-
ly understood that this is not a political 
matter, that there is no partisanship 
involved. I think that the debate today 
and prior to today, which has included 
Members from both sides of the aisle, 
emphasizes that fact. Second, as far as I 
am concerned personally, I wish to state 
for the record that I had grave doubts 
in my mind about the ABM during the 
previous 2 years of a Democratic ad-
ministration under President Johnson. I 
have grave doubts today, also. 
I am not one of those who think that 
an American citizen who wears a star, 
or two or three or four stars, on his 
shoulder, should be automatically 
branded as a brass hat and as someone 
who does not have the interest of the 
country at heart. I think that has been 
a caricature of the military. I think that 
the military by and large is trying to do 
what they can, as they see the situation, 
1n the interest and the security of the 
country. 
The fact that we may differ with them 
from time to time In no way should be 
cause for denegration of dedicated serv-
ice. 
The questions I have raised about the 
particular proposal under discussion, the 
ABM, has to do with the cost-the ac-
curate cost and not a guess or an as-
sumption-with the validity, the ac-
curacy, of the system, and whether it is 
already obsolescent. 
I think It should be emphasized that 
those of us who nave raised questions 
about the ABM have, to the best of my 
knowledge, unanimously advocated a 
continuing research and development 
program to the end that If such a sys-
tem., became necessary, we would have 
the 'best possible one at our disposal. 
Incidentally, If I were certain that the 
program were necessary, I would vote for 
every dime required to put it Into opera-
tion. 
I also have some questions about the 
Soviet ABM system, the Galosh, around 
Moscow, which may be a system on which 
work has stopped entirely, or which may 
be a system which is quite ineffective. 
Then, of course, there is the Tallln sys-
tem along the northern coast, which I 
understand is not an A.BM system in any 
sense of the word but Is an aircraft de-
fense system. 
There Is also the question of the 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. negotiations I re-
call, as I have several times. the state-
ment by the President, Mr. Nixon, in his 
inauguration address, in which he 
stressed negotiation-and not confronta-
tion. And I believe tbat what he has done 
to date Indicates that he meant it. 
Then I have to weigh against each 
other the internal security of this ooun-
try and its external security. It is a bal-
ance which we must maintain 1n some .. 
way, because we could become far 
stronger than we are at the present time 
in our external security and far weaker 
in our internal security as it Is Involved 
in the difficult and dangerous situations 
which have become so apparent In our 
urban areas and In our tural areas as 
well. 
Mr. President <Mr. CooK in the chair), 
the deployment of the Sentinel anti-
ballistic-missile system does not boil 
down to the question of whether or not 
dangerous hardwar(' should be placed 
close to or dist ant from the densely 
inhabited locations of the Nation-
whether in urban or rural settings. The 
decision involves much more. It involves 
more, even, than the initiation of an-
other round of a tmaments escalation. 
Important as t hese considerations may 
be, the ramifications of this issue reach 
far beyond them . 
The decision for or a gainst. deployment 
of the Sent inel, in present circumstances, 
may well determine the basic direction 
of public leadership for a decade or more. 
U we decide to go ahead with this proj-
ect, as we have done in other more afflu-
ent times with other weapons systems of 
questionable value, the decision can only 
be seen as a continuance of both the 
practices and the priorities of the past. 
It will be seen. properly, as an inability 
to escape from the shackles of our own 
rhetoric. Having spoken so long and so 
loudly of a distant danger, we are not 
able to hear the rising voice of need at 
hand. We are unable to do other than 
keep the emphasis of our national efforts 
on costly military systems as we have 
for the past two decades. We are not able 
to shift gears despite the serious Inner 
difficulties which loom ahead. 
Yet it is these inner difficulties, 1n my 
judgment, which prese11t the Nation with 
the clearest and most imminent danger. 
The multibillion-dollar Sentinel does not 
meet these difficulties any more than 
Vietnam has met them. On the contrary, 
it, too. may well act oo intensify them. 
As I have indicated, the Sentinel is 
not the first costly and dubious new 
weapons system which has been brought 
to the attention of the Senate durlng the 
past two decades. What Is new at this 
moment is our altered capacity to take 
on a great expenditure of questionable 
value in the light of the other demands 
which are being made on the tax-bur-
dened and lnftation-pressed citizens of 
the Nation. Quite apart from the tech-
nioal shortcomings of the Sentinel, its 
deployment would be, In my opinion, a 
movement of the Nation's leadership In 
the wrong direction and at the wrong 
time. Sentinel will not add one iota to 
the security of life In the United States. 
It may well det ract from it. 
Let me illustrate the point. Since the 
near catastrophe of the Cuban missile 
ctisis, in 1962, nuclear weapons seem to 
me to have been eliminated e.s a prac-
tical alternative in the International 
strategy of both the Soviet Union and 
the United States. It did not require a 
written agreement to confirm this under-
standing. The message came through 
loud and clear, from the brink of nu-
clear annihilation. We learned and, I be-
lieVe, they learned that a relevant sur-
viva! for both count.ricll ancl the world de-
pended upon neit.hcr nat.lon <'nt.crlng on 
any path of policy which. in t.he end. had 
to lead to nuclear confron ta tion. The 
Cuban crisis when cu\\plcd wit.h t.he Nu-
clear Test Ban T reuty has provided a 
respite of many years from the pressure 
of ever-incipient nuclear conflict be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United 
States. 
In my judgmen t. t h e deployment of a 
Sentinel ABM system would once a gain 
open up a period of grave uncertainty. 
It would tend to revitalize the use of nu-
clear weaponry as a component of the 
international strategy of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
it would have that effect without bene-
fit to either n ation but with increased 
risks to the survival of both. 
That such is the case is indicated by 
the so-called action-reaction pattern 
of strategic armament, as·it has operated 
between the two cotmtries over the years. 
For two decades or more, when the So-
viet Union has acted by making a weap-
ons advance which imbalances the nu-
clear equations between the two coun-
tries, we have reacted by an advance in 
order to maintain the balance of terror. 
In the same fashion, the Soviet Union 
has responded to our nuclear advances. 
Even if the action-reaction process is 
recognized as necessary to the mainte-
nance of a precarious peace of mutual 
terror, it does not follow that it Is being 
applied in a relevant fashion In the con-
text of the ABM Issue. It is argued, for 
example, that since the Soviet Union is 
deploying an ABM system around Mos-
cow, we must respond with the Sentinel 
ABM system. However. the relevant re-
action to the deployment of a Soviet 
ABM is not necessarily an identical ac-
tion on our part but rather a balancing 
action. We have, In fact, already re-
sponded to the Soviet ABM system. In 
the fully developed MffiV system we will 
have assured that whatever defense the 
Soviet Union might build in the way of 
an ABM structure, let alone what has 
actually been deployed, our capacity to 
penetrate it will be more than sufficient. 
To respond, now, a second time by put-
ting into place an American ABM sys-
tem-that is, by deploying the Sentinel-
is not a relevant res'ponse. It is, rather, 
the opening of another round of nuclear 
escalation. 
Under the action-reaction formula , the 
deployment of the Sentinel should and 
undoubtedly would precipitate a relevant 
response from the Soviet Union, regard-
less of the testimony to date. The Rus-
sians may be expected to increase even 
further th eir offensive capacity in order 
to assure penetration of the Sentinel de-
fense. By deploying the latter. in short. 
we will have put ourselves In the ironic 
position of stimulating the expansion of 
the over-all offensive capabilities of the 
Soviet Union against the American 
people. 
Recent statements in favor of deploy-
m ent indicate the possibility that an al-
ternative plan of deployment for the Sen-
tinel will be offered in the near future. 
As I understand the new concept, the 
chief protection of the system will be 
transferred from the vicinity of great 
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cities to the remote ICBM missile sites. 
Instead of offering protection to people 
which obviously it cannot do, the Sen-
tinel is now pro.I)06ed as a missile to pro-
tect other missiles. To put it another way, 
the Sentinel deployment is about to be 
billed not as a safeguard for our cities 
but of our deterrent capacity in the event 
of an attack against the United States. 
To what degree is this additional protec-
t 'on of the deterrent actually necessary? 
I s th re any question about the ade-
quacy-the enormous adequacy-of our 
p resent deterrence? Indeed, the accumu-
lation is already so immense as to be al-
most beyond calculation . It is many t imes 
what anyone can perceive as necessary 
for the total destruction not only of the 
Soviet Union but of the entire structure 
of civilization. Moreover. the delivery 
systems for this great power are multiple 
in number and widely dispersed. So I re-
peat is there any question about the suf-
ficiency of our present deterrent? Why is 
it necessary, then, to add the Sentinel 
protection? 
To shift the Sentinel from the popula-
tion -.;enters may allay the current con-
cern of the residents thereof about the 
dangers of accidental disaster. The shift 
may make it easier to get legislation for 
sentinel through the Congress. I repeat, 
however , what value does Sentinel as it is 
now proposed to deploy it, add to an al-
ready bulging over-loaded arsenal of de-
terrence? Beyond the emplaced missiles 
of ICBM have we forgotten the deterrent 
effect of the P olaris submarine fleet ? 
Neverth eless, if further assured deterrent 
capability of the land-based ICBM is 
really needed, would not an additional 
hardening 0f the sites be equally or more 
effective than trying to protect them with 
other missiles? 
It has been said last year and again 
this year. in effect, that Sentinel deploy-
ment will mprove our bargaining posi-
tion with the Soviet Union. It will make 
it easier, il is contended, to bring about 
mut ual disarmament. The fact is that for 
more than two decades, every major 
escalation in the arms race, every signif-
icant new addition to the nuclear arse-
nals has been introduced with precisely 
the same assurances--that somehow a 
movement forward in armament will pro-
duce agreement on disarmament. It is 
now 25 years later. Where are the dis-
armament agreements which the expan-
sion of armaments were to produce? A 
quarter of a century later, where is there 
one such agreement on a reduction of 
armaments? The fact is that not a single 
nuclear weapon has been dismantled on 
the basis of a disarmament agreement 
be tween th•! Soviet Union and the United 
States. So let us at least have the good 
sense to reason from this exper•ence that 
whatever its other merit or d. merit, Sen-
tinel is hardly an instrumen ., for bring-
ing about disarmament. 
Tile Sentinel system is already, admit-
tedly, dated-dated back to 1962, as I 
recall. It is readily acknowledged that it 
will not work against a Soviet attack. 
Nevertheless, it is contended it will be 
useful against the Chinese. This conten-
tion presupposes not one irrational Chi-
nese decision but two. In the first place 
the Chinese wduld have to make their-
rational decision to launch a dubiously 
effecti'll'e nuclear attack upon us with 
their ID06t inadequate nuclear 1esources 
even though it would bring great re .. 
talia.tory destruction to their homeland. 
This initial irrationality, however, would 
then have to be coupled with an irra-
tional Chinese choice of delivery systems 
if the Sentinel's deployment is to be jus-
t ified as a defense against China. The 
Chinese would have to decide to use 
inter-continental ballistics missles to 
launch the nuclear warheads, a nuclear 
approach into the United States against 
which we would lnve the defensive ca-
pacity of the Sentinel. They would have 
to choooe that means , rejecting the use 
of off-coast submarines which, firing 
nuclear weapons of low trajectory, 
could eliminate seattle, Portland, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Bos-
ton, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Washington, Norfolk. Charleston, S C., 
Miami, New Orleans, and Houston with-
out activating Sentinel. Why would they 
have to reject this latter approach by sea 
and with intermediate range missiles 
which would be clearly the more promis-
ing from their point of view? Because 
the Sentinel is ineffective against mis-
siles of insufficiently high trajectory. It 
is amazing to what lengths of irration-
ality the Chinese are expected to go in 
order to validate the deployment of this 
system. Is it any wonder that President 
Nixon has already rejected completely 
this specious contention as a basis for 
decision? 
There are other arguments which are 
made to justify the Sentinel deployment 
arguments of greater or lesser fragility. 
There is no need to reiterate them now. 
Each of us has had the benefit of the 
prolonged probing into the substance of 
this issue. 
I do not know what the President's rte-
cision wlll be in this mattor. The ·e-
sponsibility which is his is grave and, 
whatever he n;taY decide, it goes without 
saying that it will be because he is per-
suaded that it is in the best interests of 
of the Nation. However, the Senate, too, 
has its responsibilities--its independent 
responsibilities. We must arrive at our 
own conclusions with respect to this 
question. 
As one Senator, as a Senator from 
Montana, I have seen enough and heard 
enough to be persuaded that it would 
be inadvisable almost to the point of 
tragedy to spend out of the constricted 
financial resources of this GovernmPnt 
the enormous cost of deployment of this 
weapons system. To be sure, I can see as 
warranted, a continuauce of research 
and development on sentinel in the 
hopes of a significant technological 
breakthrough which might v:ive meanlng 
to the weapon in later circumstances. 
But to deploy the system now? We will 
begin that deployment at a cost esti-
mated at somewhere below $10 billion. 
We will end, however, in the tens of bil-
lions if this deployment actually takes 
place. 
I see no safety for this Nation i,n bris-
tling and burnished m issiles whether 
they stand tall around rtetetiorating cit-
ies, or rise in the empty fields of an im-
poverished rural society I see, rather, 
the beginnings of a deep trouble if we 
ever permit a driven pursuit of an elu-
sive security against throots abroad to 
distract us from the rising tide of in-
security at home. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. M·· Pr Ri ctent, w!ll 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me con gratu-
late the able majority leader on his pres -
entation as to why he opposes the pro-
posed Sentinel system. I am glad, also, 
that I had the opportunity to hear the 
fine address on this subject by the dis-
tinguished junior Senator from Mary-
land (Mr. MATHIAS). 
I would ask the majority leader, is it 
not true that the ADM system was first 
offered a s a system to defend against 
the Chinese; but that was changed when 
it appeared the system could not be sold 
on that basis? Then after the clLies ob-
jected, it was changed. as the Senator 
from Montana so well brought out. to 
a system that would protect our missile 
sites. 
Is is not true that none of this has 
anything to do with the missiles which 
would be launched from our Polaris 
submarines? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Th-at is correct. So 
far as the Sentinel system being directed 
against China was concemed, that, in 
my opinion, was always a phony and un-
palatable argument. I just could not 
swallow iL. I could not believe it. I was 
glad to note that President Nixon did not, 
to use his words, "buy it" either. 
Of course, during the debate last year, 
it was brought out that instead of this 
system being directed against China, it 
was being directed against the Soviet 
Union. This produced a popular outcry 
when it was announced-not so much In 
my part of the country; we are used to it. 
When the country focused on tl1is issue 
and asked what the ABM would look 
like, or what the results would be--for 
the first time we find the President 
ordering a review. I honor the President 
for what he has done. I recognize the fact 
that the Director of the Disarmament 
Agency, Girard Smith, a very fine man 
and a good G<Jvemment official, and Mr. 
Melvin Laird, a former outstanding Rep-
resentative. have indicated there is a 
possibility that a really thin ABM sys -
tem will be put into operation. Despite 
this fact and the rumors that it will be 
put into operation around the missile 
sites and not in the cities, I nevertheless, 
have faith and confidence in the Presi-
dent of the United States ll'ho, I believe. 
is keeping an open mind and is trying to 
arrive at a decision after a thorough 
review of all the facts. It is he who will 
make the final decision, sometime next 
wcPk. We cannot go beyond that PfJlnt. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. We know that our 
Polaris submarines have hundn'c!s of 
nuclear missiles ready to be launched 
against any aggressor, missilE's that are 
a great deal more lethal lhan the Hiro-
shima bomb. In addition, is it not also 
true that we have many thousands of 
shorter range nuclear weapons all over 
Europe, and in other parts of the world . 
which could come into action for the 
defense of our country, or the country of 
an ally. The proposed sentinel would 
have nothing whatever to do with those 
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thousands of warheads. Is that not cor-
rect' 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect. Many thousands of missiles. is the 
correct way to state it. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. I again thank the 
able majority leader and congratulate 
him on his outstanding presentation of 
this critically important issue. 
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I also would 
likP to corrunent on thP remarks of the 
majority leader, which I believe have 
been exceedingly helpful. I wonder 
whether I might ask a question of the 
Senator from Montana on how we could 
protect our ICBM bases or missiles in an-
other way. As I read the January 15 
statement by the outgoing Secretary of 
Deferu;e, Clark Clifford, he indicated that 
for a relatively modest appropriation-
! think it was $58 million-they could 
superharden the missile sites and with-
stand an impact of tremendous power. 
As I understand it, within a quarter of 
a mile, they could withstand that kind 
of blast. 
Would this not be a better system, and 
would not the majority leader support 
such a request for funds as a means of 
protecting our ICBM bases, rather than 
going into the deployment of the system 
we are now discussing? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed. I so 
stated during the course of my remarks. 
I think it would be a cheap price to pay 
for this additional protection. At the 
same time, as the Senator knows, those 
of us who have raised questions about 
the ABM syftem would like to see con-
tinued research and development in that 
field so that i: and when it became neces-
sary-and t 1at day might come--we 
would have the best possible weapons 
system avaihble. 
Mr. PERCY. May I further ask whether 
the distingnlshed majority leader is 
aware of th•! feelings of the Honorable 
William Fo~ter who, for 8 years after 
coming to the Disarmament Agency, 
probably bad as much to do with nego-
tiating with the Sovie~ Union as any 
American, and what his attitude would 
be as to wh• ther it would be wise for us 
to sit down with the Soviet Union now 
to discuss :\ potential agreement, and 
whether he might have expressed to the 
majority leader an opinion as to whether 
a useful agreement could be reached in 
this area? 
Mr. MAl\SFIELD. He has not ex-
pressed that opinion to me, but I have 
heard that he had expressed it to other 
Members. 
I would throw the ball back to the Sen-
ator from Illinois and ask him whether 
he could answer the question which he 
has just raised, because I believe he has 
been a close friend of Mr. Foster for a 
good many years. 
Mr. PERCY. It is my feeling that he 
was of that impression, that a very high 
priority should be placed on discussions 
with the Soviet Union. 
I believe that I could quote the former 
VIce President of the United States, In 
a conversation with him in which I asked 
him, during a briefing at the White-
House, when I first came to the Senate, 
to show us why we should not deploy 
an ABM system and why it would not 
make any sense for the country to build 
one. I also asked him at the time whether, 
if we reached an. agreement in this area, 
we had the ability to police the agree-
ment, whether our satellite reconnais-
sance would be adequate, and whether 
an ABM system could be deployed In the 
Soviet Union without detection. 
He indicated at the time that they 
could not deploy such a system without 
detection. Just as in Cuba we were able 
to pick out what was being done there 
and progressively to follow it through 
photo reconnaissance the same could be 
done with ABM sites. 
So that here we can draw up an agree-
ment. the integrity of which can be pre-
served with our present scientific and 
technical capability It would not requlr<' 
on-thr-sitc inspection in order to pre-
serve the useful integrity of a useful 
agreement. 
Mr MANSFIELD If the Srnalor will 
allow me to interrupt him Jet me say 
that on the question of Mr. Foster and 
his associate director or deputy, Adrian 
Fisher. this country ha~; been served well. 
I anticipate that we will be served just 
as well by the present Director, Girard 
Smith. who has had previous experience 
in the State Department, who is a well 
known, highly regarded and well re-
spected individual, and who, in response 
to a question before the Gore subcom-
mittee yesterday, slated ftatly that while 
there had been a meeting of the Na-
tional Security Council-and this is all 
in public-absolutely no decision had 
been reached. It is that, in part, which 
makes me hopeful that the President Is 
giving this his closest, personal attention 
and is trying to look at all the factors in-
volved, keeping in mind the need for 
funds to take care of the decay, disin-
tegration, violence, and crime which are 
occurring within the Nation itself. I feel 
for hi~. because he has a great and grave 
responsibility. 
To repeat: I know that no matter what 
his dPcis ion '>'! ill be, it will be because hP 
thinks it will be in the best interests of 
the security of this Nation. 
Mr. PERCY. One last question for the 
majo ·ity leader, if I may. Docs It not 
seem a bit strange that, in response LO 
the deployment of an ABM system in 
Moscow, which admittedly has been 
slowed up or almost arre~;tcd now, we 
are going to build an ABM syst.em, as last 
announced In some 20 cities, but we do 
not propose to build it in Washington, 
D.C .. because, as I understand it, there is 
not to be an ABM installation within 200 
miles of our Nation's Capital? 
If It is so important to protect Chicago, 
Detroit, and Pittsburgh In re.sponse to a 
Moscow deployment, why, in the infinite 
wisdom of the Defense Department, have 
they not chosen to protect the Nation's 
Capital? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is a good ques-
tion. I do not know the answer. 
Mr. PERCY. May I just comment, 
finally, that sever·al days ago I had the 
privilege of going out on a nuclear sub-
marine for the first time. I spent 3 years 
in Naval Avat!on, but I never had been 
in a submarine. I had the opportunity to 
spend a leisurely period of some hours in 
the wardroom of that nuclear submarine, 
one which carried the potential. with all 
the Polaris missiles it had on board, of 
po.;sessing more explosl\·e power than 
both sides dropped during all or World 
War II. That was just one of 41 nuclear 
submarines. 
I put the ques tion to t!1" c•·ew ,,d to 
the officers-to the officer , e , r lt ia l " 
of this submarine: "Let us role >lnv );"! e 
Suppose you are ordered to ntlack l\Ic • 
cow because they have attacked us. an•l 
suppose also that they not only ll:>vr t ll' 
ABM missile system that they ha \ c 
partially deployed there, but they haye 
everything we now know how to inst<~ll 
in the Sentinel system. They have a full 
complex of Sprints, Spartan~':, softwear. 
computers. and everything else. Woulct 
you be able to penetrate H ?" Th!'y said. 
' 'Absolutely. All we would have to do Is 
exhaust them and then put up sufficient 
firepower. Our reconnalssanee wnuld 
know what their system is rnpnble of 
doing ami we woulrt always be sure lint 
we had one more Even if everything we 
were able to put up were knocked down 
up to 100, the lOlst is all we need. So we 
would just exhaust the system." From 
their standpoint, it was less expensive to 
build the extra offensive power than to 
build the defensive system. 
So the psychology the majority leader 
ha~ pointed out, about this senseless and 
reckless escalation of nuclear war capa-
bilities. would be carried on because that 
is the military mentality, and is it their 
responsibility and obligation to always 
build somethin~ to oliset the defensive 
weapons established. The same mentality 
that exists In the Pentagon can be as-
sumed to exist in the Soviet military 
service. 
I thank the Senator for yielding. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator 
from Illinois. I think this action-reaction 
process holds true not only in the field 
of armaments, but also in this body as 
well. 
Mr MATHIAS Mr President, wlll the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr MATHIAS I wish to thank the 
distinguished majority leadE'r for his con-
tinued efforts to shed l!p:ht in this area. 
not only by what he has said today but 
what he has done over a Jonr: period of 
time. I was particularly struck by the 
value of that part of his remarks to-
day which detailed the chronology of 
thinking in the ABM field, as to the ob-
jective of such a system, on the one hand 
directed against a Russian attack, on the 
other hand directed against a Chinese 
attack. I think by detailing the chronol-
ogy, as he has done, he made it very 
clear that the proponents of the sys-
tem arc not able to define what their 
objective is, over an extended period of 
time, with any great preciR!on. This is 
certainly a very major factor that has 
to be considered before a decision to go 
ahead I am singling out this particular 
aspect of the Senator's remarks. I am 
not In any way overlooking the value 
of the rest o! what h<> said. but I think 
the question of where we are aiming has 
to be c.lecided conclusively, nnd until it 
is. we cannot make any intelligent de-
cision. 
Mr MANSFIELD. J apprt>icnte the re-
marks of the able St>nator I am hopeful 
that the discussion t 1is afternoon. and 
the discussions over the past several 
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weeks--discussions which, I want to em-
phasize, have been carried on in a very 
statesmanlike manner and on a very high 
plane--will be given the consideration 
which many of us feel they wan-ant. It 
is my belief that what has been said on 
both sides of the aisle will be given that 
attention, and, hopefully, will play a 
part before a final decision is reached. 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not 
know what decision the President may 
make on the deployment of the Sentinel 
ABM system as was proposed by the ad-
ministration of President Johnson, or 
some modification of that system. What-
ever decision is made, I have no doubt 
that President Nixon will act in what he 
considers to be in the security and best 
interest of the United States. 
I argue today that the Presid~nt should 
not order a deployment of an ABM sys-
tem. Since last year when the Congress 
provided the original funds for deploy-
ment, there has been a continuing and 
more informed debate in the Congress 
and in the country as to its necessity. I 
believe that the process of consultation 
with the Congress, and of education and 
open debate in our country, should go on 
until all facts available have been pre-
sented to the Congress and the country 
before a decision is made to deploy. We 
do not yet know all the facts. 
My second reason is that deployment 
should be delayed until the President has 
had an opportunity to determine whether 
the Soviet Union will enter negotiations 
and negotiate in good faith on the control 
of defensive and offensive nuclear weap-
ons systems. There is no surer way to 
test the fidelity of the Soviet offer to ne-
gotiate a cessation of the nuclear arrns 
race. The clearly understood ability of 
both the United States and the Soviet 
Union that each has the assured ability 
to destroy each other has been the de-
terrent against nuclear war and is the 
basis for a possible settlement. It is the 
only kind of "bargaining from strength" 
that has meaning. 
Is there some new element of danger 
which we do not yet know which requires 
the early deployment of some defensive 
system? And it is to this question that I 
address myself chiefly today. 
Over the past year, the Senate and 
public have become aware that the ra-
tionale offered for the Sentinel ABM sys-
tem has been confusing and contradic-
tory, whether described as a protection 
against a Soviet Union or Communist 
Chinese nuclear attack. This was crisply 
clarified during the first days of hearings 
held by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee on Disarmament under 
Senator GoRE, by the testimony of three 
of the country's most informed nuclear 
missile scientists, Dr. Hans Bethe, Dr. J. 
P. Ruina, and Dr. Daniel Fink. Their 
testimony confirmed the position that 
former Secretaries of Defense Mc-
Namara and Clifford and Dr. Foster, 
Chief of Research and Development of 
the Department of Defense, had stoutly 
maintained that the Sentinel system 
would provide no protection against a 
massive Soviet attack. Dr. Bethe and Dr. 
Ruina gave little support for the argu-
ment that it would provide limited pro-
tection against China or that there was 
credibility in reasoning that such attack 
might occur. 
Senator RICHARD RUSSELL'S instinctive 
judgment that the Chinese rationale for 
the Sentinel system is not credible is 
also held by these two scientists and by 
many in the Senate and throughout the 
country. You will recall that Senator 
RussELL said in hearings before the Sen-
ate Appropriations Committee last year: 
This concept of a mlssle attack orlglnatlng 
In China any time In the near future seems 
to me to be very remote. The Chinese are 
not completely crazy; they are not going to 
attack us with four or five mlsslles when 
they know we have the capab111ty of vir-
tually destroying their entire country. They 
wm fight us with conventional weapons, 1f 
we do have a war, ln order to run us out of 
Korea or some slmllar area. All of this talk 
about preparing for a Chinese mlsslle at-
tack, In my judgment, ls just to cover up 
an admission of error In not starting an 
antl-ball1stlc m!sslle system against Soviet 
Russia any earller than we clld. 
Later in the same testimony, the dis-
tinguished chairman said: 
I don't think there Is any question but 
what they will proceed to develop one. It 
Is Inconceivable to me that they would fire 
the first ones they had against this country 
and know they would be destroyed If they 
did so. I am glad we are going ahead, you 
understand, but I don't !Ike people to think 
I am being kidded by this talk of defense 
against a. Chinese nuclear threat because I 
don't think that the Chinese are likely to 
attack us with an Intercontinental ballistic 
missile at any time In the near future . 
I am delighted that the executive branch 
finally decided to proceed with the deploy-
ment of even this "thin" ABM system, be-
cause It Is the first step toward the deploy-
ment of the complete system that I think 
Is required. I have often said that I felt that 
the first country to deploy an etrectlve ABM 
system and an e!Iectlve ASW system Is going 
to control this world mllltarlly. 
The three witnesses raised another 
key issue in their testimony which must 
be considered. It is relevant because I 
believe the issue is .one that the admin-
istration is presently considering, and 
upon which it may base its recommen-
dations to the Congress. The scientists 
agreed that ihe deployment of the ra-
dars and the Sprints to protect the sites 
of our offensive ICBM missiles would 
provide needed protect!.on if the Soviet 
Union increased the number and quality 
of its offensive missile forces by the de-
velopment of MIRV, FOBS, and related 
offensive weapons. The capacity of such 
offensive weapons to neutralize our 
ICBM missiles and destroy our offensive 
ICBM capability would destroy or de-
grade our deterrent. 
I comment on this issue by noting that 
the United States is also proceeding with 
the development of MIRV, and that it 
posseses over 600 missiles positioned in 
our polaris submarines. We have not 
been told that the Soviet Union is de-
ploying any missiles such as Sprint to 
protect its ICBM bases. 
Unless there are new facts which would 
upset the existing assured balance, that 
make it imperative for the United States 
to deploy such a site defensive system 
now, and 1f there are such facts, they 
should be made clear to the Congress 
and the American people. I do not believe 
that the United States should initiate the 
deployment of a Sentinel system whether 
as proposed by the past administration 
as an area of defense to protect our cities 
and industries, or a missile site defen-
sive system. If the Unitrd St.ntes doP~ :-;o 
without new fnets to justify lrnnwrllntr 
danger, it could br rrsponsible for Lli<' 
commencement of n new stn~o:(' In lllP nu -
clear arms race-It st1we that would bP 
matched by the Soviet Union and ll con-
tinuing nuclear race which could become 
irreversible. 
Out of all the testimony heard ye . .,trr-
day, I think it very important that the 
Congress, the news media, and the people 
of our country remember the statementq 
of the three scientists on this issue. Is 
there such a present danger as to require 
the deployment of either the proposed 
Sentinel system, or the deployment of 
Sprint or similar missiles at our ICBM 
sites, before negotiations occur? Both Dr. 
Bethe and Dr. Ruina gave their opinion 
that there is not such a danger. They 
suggested that before the deployment of 
Sprint at missile sites there should be 
greater study of the type of defense that 
should be provided. I believe that Dr. 
Fink said with respect to the necessity of 
immediate deployment of Sprint at mis-
sile sites, that he would want to study 
the question further. 
Senator SYMINGTON has spoken about 
the enormous costs involved in the de-
ployment of an ABM system. If we do 
not enter into negotiations and conclude 
an arms limitation agreement, our coun-
try w1ll face an annual investment o! 
offensive and defensive missiles in the 
tens of billion of dollars. If this expendi-
ture is necessary for the security of our 
country, I will support it. But we must 
recognize that both the United States 
and the Soviet Union have the capacity 
to keep up with the other in offensive 
and defensive weapons. With a continu-
ing nuclear arms race we will end up at 
some later stage no further ahead, and 
we will be less secure because of the 
proliferation of United States and Soviet 
nuclear weapons in the world. 
Because of the enormous stakes in-
volved. the costs, our security and human 
life, I hope the President will defer de-
ployment until he can determine whether 
negotiations leading to a limitation of 
the nuclear arms race will be successful. 
It would be in harmony with his stated 
desire and purpose to be a peacemaker. 
He has, I believe, an opportunity that 
perhaps no other President has had be-
fore him. It is the chance to halt the nu-
clear arms race. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that three articles that appeared in 
the Wall Street Journal, the Washington 
Star, and the New York Times on the 
hearings held by the Foreign Relations 
Committee yesterday be placed in the 
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. 
There being no objection, the material 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
I From the Wall Street Journnl , Mar. 5, 19691 
THE GREAT ABM DEBATE 
Were Its lmpllca.tlons not so grrwe, the 
great debate over the antl-balllst!c mlss!le 
would be somewhat comical. At first blush, 
It Is hard to believe that a number of com-
petent men, presumably proceeding from the 
same data, can arrive at d!runetr!cnlly op-
posed ooncluslons. 
In any event, the Center for the Study of 
Democratic Institutions hns performed a use-
ful service in publishing a microcosm of the 
debate. in the form of statements and a dis-
cussion by experts and others at least fam!liar 
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